MATTHEW M. TAYLOR:  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Matthew M. Taylor, a North Americanpolitical scientist who teaches at the University of São Paulo, seeks toexplain why it is that particular political actors have used the federal courtsto challenge Brazilian presidents and Congress on matters of policy reform. Inrecent years Brazilian courts have often served as effective weapons for thosewho want to delay the implementation of policies, whether the privatization ofstate-owned companies or the reform of pension programs. In some cases, thishas created an opportunity for the policies themselves to be changed. Taylorbuilds his argument in a core chapter on a relatively small number of casestudies from the 1990s when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was president.

Taylor is writing against his fellowpolitical scientists' assumptions that Latin American courts are notindependent institutions. Having experienced two decades of military rule,however, those who crafted the 1988 Constitution were determined to revive andrenew compromised institutions and give the judiciary itself more authority andautonomy. The Brazilian judicial system is institutionally strong and, to somedegree, getting stronger, not least of all because particular political actorswant to make it so. Brazil now has a healthy system of checks and balances (andTaylor himself makes clear that he rejects the notion that this has helped makeBrazil ungovernable). Judges are not, of course, truly independent actors, inthat they have to be put in play by those who have legal standing to do so.These include the prosecutor-general, leaders in the Senate and the Chamber ofDeputies, governors, political parties, the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB),and unions. Unsurprisingly, the degree to which particular policies arecontested in the courts is related to the perceived costs and benefits tospecific groups. Taylor makes clear that the courts are used most often when thecosts of policies are "concentrated" while the benefits are spread out.

Taylor provides helpful informationon the structure of the Brazilian judiciary. He also discusses its weaknesses:Positions are often not filled, there are too many laws, caseloads are alwaystoo heavy, and movement through the courts is highly congested. The legalsystem is inefficient and unable to protect individuals the way it should. Onappeal it can take eight to ten years to reach a final decision, and usuallythe original decision is upheld. The limited education of the judges may leadthem to reach narrowly considered decisions. In any case, any individualjudge's decision has relatively less impact than one might imagine, given thevolume of cases handled and given the fact that there are few "formally bindingor universally applicable" decisions

Taylor is most insightful when he isdiscussing why particular groups make use of the judiciary the way they do. Hefocuses particularly on the Workers Party (PT) and the OAB, which have playedparticularly important roles in using the courts to try and blockimplementation of policies they do not approve of. One may admire the PT'sattempt to prevent what it considered majoritarian domination, as well as theirwillingness to challenge what they considered unconstitutional actions. Theparty's goals during the Cardoso years were to "delay or disable" theimplementation of reform, as well as to provide a "voice" for opposition. Intheory, at least, in the process of slowing implementation of particularpolicies, the PT hoped to encourage debate, though it might be argued that, inmany cases, there already should have been considerable debate by the electedrepresentatives of the Brazilian population. It is important to remember that atthe time the PT had only twelve percent of the seats in the Chamber ofDeputies. (Ironically, Taylor notes, the PT had not engaged in the samepractices when the Lula administration had proposed rather similar reforms,while Cardoso's PSDB, now in opposition, generally did not make use of thecourts when it was in opposition because it approved of the substance of manyof them.)

The OAB has also made "intensiveuse" of the courts, for obvious and not so obvious reasons. It was aninstitution that was also strengthened by the 1988 constitution. The OAB hasplayed a significant role over time in opposing military rule and it continuesto see itself as the "watchdog of democracy." Yet is has also acted out ofnarrow professional interests when, for example, it challenged a cap onhonoraria paid to lawyers in land-expropriation cases.

In the final chapter Taylor providesa comparative study of Argentine, Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Mexican judiciariesand their response to pension reform. Brazil, as it turns out, was the only oneof those four countries whose judiciary played a significant role in shapingthe process of reform. This underscores the point made throughout the body ofthe text regarding its institutional strength. Despite similar authoritarian experiencesin other South American countries, their judiciaries did not achieve the samedegree of independence as the Brazilian one. 

Many Latin Americanists interestedin the judiciary will find this book a valuable contribution to the literature.However, the book is repetitious, particularly in the early chapters, and itcertainly reads at times as if it had to be stretched to make a book. In a muchtoo short conclusion, Taylor certainly could have reflected more on therelations between the developments he describes and the nature and quality ofBrazilian democracy. His tone is balanced, but his arguments could have beenmore robust. The judiciary and the executive may not always see eye to eye, butwhich one more accurately reflects popular wishes? Taylor also might have donemore to address attempts to broaden the "effective legal franchise," whichcould make the judiciary an even more effective instrument of Braziliandemocracy.

AndrewJ. Kirkendall                                     Texas A&M University