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The Case of
the 1992 and 1994 Attacks in Buenos Aires
CARLOS
ESCUDÉ Universidad Nacional del CEMA, Buenos Aires
BEATRIZ
GUREVICH Universidad Nacional del CEMA, Buenos Aires
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The obliteration of the Embassy of
Israel and the Jewish community center known as AMIA (Asociación
Mutual Israelita Argentina), two of the worst terrorist attacks
worldwide during the 1990s, and the complex web of complicities,
corruption and limits to governability that hindered the
investigation of these acts are an interesting case for a broader
study of the relationship between state disintegration, corruption
and terrorism.
After 11 September 2001, it is
increasingly clear that in many Third World scenarios the struggle
against transnational terrorism will face major obstacles derived
from state disintegration and corruption, which contribute to set the
scene for terrorist complicities. The study of the Argentine case (in
which the limits to governability were barely visible in 1992 and
1994, but have since grown) can help to demonstrate in a compelling
manner the nature of these challenges. [1]
This study will document the nature
of the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires, the role of the limits to
governability in the generation of complicities that conspired
against the investigation's success during five
administrations, [2]
and the role of corruption in the obstruction of justice. Its
relevance lies not only in the fact that these unsolved cases
underscore the interplay between corruption, limits to governability
and a terrorist menace that struck twice in Argentina and can
strike again, but also in the even more ominous consideration that
transnational terrorism can potentially make use of the laissez
faire, laissez passer made possible by corruption and the erosion
of state authority to provide the logistics for staging attacks
elsewhere. Indeed, this appears to be a sphere of global politics in
which the center-periphery dichotomy loses relevance.
Argentina as a target of Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism
ceased to be a foreign phenomenon for Argentina long before 11
September 11 2001. Indeed, when Hezbollah (Party of God), an armed
branch of Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for the bombing of
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, on 17 March 1992, that killed
twenty-two people, it became clear that Islamic terrorism had gone
global and that its targets were not limited to Israeli and American
interests. [3]
Prior to its 1992 attack in Buenos Aires, neither Iran nor Hezbollah
had attacked Israeli or Jewish targets abroad. Rather, Iran preferred
to encourage Hezbollah to strike Israeli military objectives in
Lebanon. But after the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, a
spate of deadly attacks was launched against Israel and other Jewish
targets throughout the world. [4]
Interestingly, Argentina preceded U.S. territory as a target of
Islamic fundamentalism.
But the scourge did not stop with
the bombing of the Embassy. The second Islamic terrorist attack in
Buenos Aires was perpetrated on 18 July 1994, demolishing the
building of the AMIA. There were eighty-five dead and approximately
300 wounded. In this case also, all roads led to Hezbollah as well as
Iran and Syria. Ten days before the bombing, the Argentine government
had been warned of the impending attack by a strange tipster who
walked into the Argentine Consulate in Milan. [5]
This individual, a frightened Brazilian who introduced himself as
Wilson Dos Santos, explained that his former
girlfriend, an Iranian prostitute whom he had met in Buenos Aires
with strong connections to her country's Embassy, belonged to a
terrorist cell that had bombed the Israeli Embassy in Argentina. He
said the terrorists were preparing to bomb another Jewish target in
Buenos Aires, a building that was being renovated (which was, in
fact, the case of the AMIA building). Dos Santos also approached the
Brazilian and Israeli consulates and provided more information in
frantic phone calls to the police in Buenos Aires and in meetings
with Argentine agents in Rome just after the bombing. [6]
The warning
went unheeded and Dos Santos' tip was forwarded to higher authorities
only after the attack. Dos Santos reiterated his story on the day of
the bombing, but then went on to deny it in subsequent
interrogations. [7]
Nevertheless, investigations have shown that Dos Santos was heavily
involved with Middle Easterners in the so-called Triple Border
between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, [8]
and that the persons he mentioned in his first declarations existed
and had a profile consistent with that of potential accessories to
the bombing.
More direct
confirmation of Hezbollah and Iranian involvement in the AMIA bombing
was provided by a witness codenamed "C", a repentant
high-level Iranian intelligence official who used the alias of
Abolghasem Mesbahi, son of one of the leaders of the Islamic
Revolution and protected by Germany since 1996. He testified
repeatedly from 1998 onwards that planning for the attack in Buenos
Aires began in 1992. He said the operation was led by Mohsen Rabbani
(the cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy at the time,
whose name also came up in the Dos Santos investigation) and
supervised by Hamid Naghashan, a senior official in the Iranian
intelligence agency. According to the New York Times' account,
he said that "one cell focused on cooperating with members of
the Argentine police, corrupting them or threatening them to
collaborate with the attack" while "another devoted itself
to obtaining the explosives" in Brazil. According to the Times
version, the witness also accused then President Carlos Menem of
accepting a US$ 10 million bribe to obstruct the investigation (an
accusation from which "C" later retracted in a letter to
the SIDE, [9]
made public in January 2003). [10]
An earlier version in Clarín also implicated Menem in
an Iranian bribe, but predates it to 1990 and attributes the hush-up
not to the bribe but to increased Iranian meat and cereal imports
after the blast. [11]
These versions place the
responsibility for masterminding the operation on Iran. [12]
Yet the operational involvement of Hezbollah in the actual execution
of the attack, and the important logistical role played by local
mercenaries, including rogue elements from both the federal and
provincial security forces, are also mentioned and have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, in late September 2002 the
suicide bomber who carried out the terrorist attack was identified.
He was a young Lebanese from Baalbeck and a Hezbollah militant who
went by the name of Ibrahim Hussein Berro. [13]
Soon after the attack, he received the homage of his relatives, and
today a square in his native town bears his name. The terrorist
entered Argentina illegally through the Triple Border. This
information was corroborated by the CIA and the Mossad. [14]
The Iranian connection was also confirmed inasmuch as the CIA and the
Mossad made it known to Argentine intelligence that at least
seventeen couriers had arrived at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires
several days before the blast and all had left by July 17,
twenty-four hours before the attack. Moreover, one of the prime
suspects of masterminding the Argentine attacks, also accused by
Witness "C", is Imad Fayez Mugniyah, one of the twenty-two
most wanted terrorists on the list released by President George W.
Bush on 10 October 2001. [15]
The Condor II and the Syrian connection
But Iran and Hezbollah were not the
only transnational actors sponsoring the attacks. Another actor,
which is insinuated in the Times article but was well known to
officials in the Argentine Foreign Ministry during Guido Di Tella's
tenure (1991-1999), was Syria. Both Syria and Libya [16]
had provided financial sources for Menem's 1989 presidential
campaign. [17]
When Menem became president, he developed a good relationship with
the Syrian government and when Iraq invaded Kuwait, he promised Hafez
al-Assad that Syria would inherit the Iraqi partnership in
Argentina's Condor II ballistic missile project, and would also
become a privileged recipient of Argentine nuclear technology.
The Condor II requires explanation.
In January 1984, former president Raúl Alfonsín, chief
of state of the then recently re-democratized Argentina, signed a
secret agreement with Egypt and Iraq for the development and
production of an intermediate range ballistic missile, the Condor II,
that theoretically was to be slightly superior to the U.S. Pershing
II, capable of carrying a payload of over 1000 pounds across a
distance of more than 1000 kilometers, with a state-of-the-art
guidance system. [18]
In other words, it would have been capable of carrying an average
nuclear warhead from Patagonia to Falklands/Malvinas or from Baghdad
to Tel Aviv. Libya would also contribute
to financing the missile's development. [19]
However, the project ran into trouble because, not long after Menem
became president, the world's geopolitical configuration changed
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq was a certain loser and a
partnership with it was no longer feasible, so Menem (who is of
Syrian descent) negotiated with Assad, who had helped him fund his
electoral campaign.
But the promises made to Syria were
to remain unfulfilled. After the Gulf War, U.S. diplomatic pressure
(plus a certain inclination in that direction on the part of Guido Di
Tella and his team) caused Argentina to shelf the Condor missile
project and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Assad felt
betrayed and simply eliminated Argentina from the targets forbidden
to Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Lebanese terrorist organization under
Syrian military protection.
This green light to Hezbollah was
reinforced soon afterwards by the added motivation provided by the
killing in Lebanon, on 16 February 1992, of Abbas El Mousawi,
secretary general of the organization, along with his wife and
daughter. At Mousawi's funeral, Sheik Fadlallah, Hezbollah's
spiritual leader, vowed to seek revenge. [20]
The scene was thus set for an attack against the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires, co-sponsored by Iran and Syria and executed by
Hezbollah, with the logistical support of local right-wing,
anti-Jewish mercenaries with links to the state security forces.
At first, the CIA office in Buenos
Aires asserted that Syrian authorities might also have been behind
the terrorist act, together with Iran and Hezbollah. This could have
been embarrassing to the Menem administration, since revealing the
details of Menem's previous dealings with Assad and his regime would
not have been flattering and might even have been incriminating. But
soon enough U.S. agencies began to divert attention from Syria,
focusing exclusively on Iran and Hezbollah. According to some
analysts, this was due to the American and Israeli perception that
Syria could be co-opted for the Middle East peace process. From this
point of view, it was not worthwhile to sacrifice such an opportunity
for the sake of solving the case of the terrorist attacks in Buenos
Aires. Thus, concealing the Syrian involvement, or at least not
following the Syrian lead all the way, was congenial to all parties
concerned with the investigation. The generalized perception of
senior Argentine Foreign Ministry sources was that Syria had been an
important co-sponsor of both the 1992 and 1994 bombings, but that it
was in no one's interest to bring this out, excepting the victims'
families organized in the non-governmental institution Memoria
Activa. [21]
The need for a cover-up
But there were other incriminating
elements connected to the terrorist attacks that were largely
overlooked in the investigations. In the context of a 1995 Hearing
before the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of
Representatives, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Philip C. Wilcox, attributed the lack of
substantive investigation results to poor coordination among
Argentine security and intelligence networks, and to the ill will of
the Buenos Aires provincial police. [22]
At the same Hearing, Avi Weiss, Senior Rabbi of
the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale and National President of the
Coalition for Jewish Concerns, went much further, accusing the
Argentine National Bureau of Migrations (DNM) of complicity with the
terrorists. He denounced that in January 1990, "the Syrian
terrorist Monzer al Kassar, linked to the Achille Lauro hijacking,
had been permitted to enter Argentina by (Navy Captain Aurelio
Carlos) Martínez," suspected of human rights violations
during the military dictatorship of 1976-83 and National Director of
Migrations during the Menem administration. [23]
Indeed, Al Kassar was even granted
Argentine citizenship during Menem's tenure, allegedly upon the
initiative of the President himself. [24]
In Buenos Aires, he was connected to the local branch of the infamous
transnational money-laundering bank BCCI (Banco de Crédito
Comercial Internacional), and is himself suspected of money
laundering and financing terrorism. [25]
He was officially appointed arms dealer for the Menem government and
commissioned, among other things, the sale of several submarines. [26]
Even more important, he was involved in dealings with Arab countries
concerning the Condor II missile, as established by several
intelligence documents from the Argentine Ministry of Defense.
Moreover, Al Kassar had connections in the Argentine Air Force,
especially through Brigadier General Ernesto
Horacio Crespo and Brigadier General
José Antonio Juliá. [27]
Thus, Monzer al Kassar is possibly
a crucial yet never fully investigated link between Syria, Menem's
broken promises to Hafez al-Assad, the terrorist attacks, money
laundering, and perhaps other arms-trafficking scandals during the
Menem administration. Although the official AMIA/DAIA report of 1997
recommended investigating him, it diplomatically
shied away from suggesting a Syrian connection. This was in
keeping with the attitude of some Argentine Jewish leaders who
preferred to let the investigation lapse, since they believed that an
indictment of Syria would help neither Israel nor the Middle East
peace process. [28]
By contrast, a 1999 report prepared
by the legislators of Acción por la República (a
political party headed by former Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo)
contended that the absence of a real investigation of a Syrian
connection was but an attempt "to divert public attention away
from any suspicion that [the Menem administration] was involved in
the attacks." [29]
The report also suggests a cover-up to conceal Menem's illegal
campaign funding by Syria and Libya, and Menem's unfulfilled
promises to Arab countries as a key trigger for the bombings. The
same is true of the report of the Special Bicameral Commission for
the Follow-up of the Investigation of the Terrorist Acts Against the
Israeli Embassy and the AMIA building, which delved both into Al
Kassar's presumed participation in the bombing and that of Ibrahim al
Ibrahim, also suspected of being connected to the attack. The latter
was a former colonel in Syrian intelligence, closely linked to Menem,
who was graciously granted Argentine citizenship. Even though he
barely spoke Spanish, he was appointed special advisor to the
Argentine Customs, and thus placed in a position from which he could
facilitate all sorts of illicit trafficking.
[30]
Autonomy of security services and erosion of
state authority
Another issue denounced by Weiss to
the House Committee was that the Federal Police guard was off duty
and that the neighborhood police patrol was mysteriously unaccounted
for at the time of both bombings. [31]
He complained that there had been no meaningful investigation of who
had ordered the police guards to abandon their posts at the Israeli
Embassy and the AMIA just before each attack. [32]
Weiss accused the Argentine state of "stonewalling the
investigation," adding that "A cover-up operation is taking
place… It was clear from the very beginning of the AMIA
investigation that the police had one preferred lead, Iran, and that
they were not going to give serious consideration to other leads that
would embarrass the Menem government." Weiss also collected
evidence that "Menem employed many with extreme right-wing or
neo-Nazi views or criminals with murderous pasts in the state
intelligence service, people with notorious backgrounds like Pascual
Oscar Guerrieri, a repressor during the last military dictatorship,
appointed by Menem as a SIDE advisor… One cannot expect
individuals with this kind of view to carry out a serious
investigation into either bombing…". [33]
The involvement of police and
military elements in both terrorist attacks probably points more in
the direction of security service autonomy and serious limits to
governability than to direct state complicity in the attacks
themselves. Although there were many reasons for Menem to seek a
cover-up that would conceal incriminating links, he had everything to
lose and nothing to gain from the bombings. But rogue elements in the
two police forces (federal and provincial), as well as among the
military (the so-called carapintadas, who had previously
rebelled against Alfonsín and Menem), were in a position to
act autonomously. Once they had done so, the administration probably
felt that to expose them would be more destabilizing than to protect
them. In addition, as we shall see below, the local intelligence
services (themselves an important part of the investigating team)
probably had malfeasances of their own to hide.
The improvised cover-up was
apparent soon after the 1994 attack. In his first press conference
after the AMIA bombing, Menem intimated that the carapintadas
were responsible for the act. Hours later, however, Minister of
Defense Erman González rejected this possibility. In
August, after denying what he had stated in the original press
conference, the President denounced Iran and tried to distract
attention from the purported local connection. [34]
Nevertheless, the Special Bicameral
Commission provided important information on the local connection for
both attacks. Judge Juan José Galeano and prosecutor Eamon
Mullen went further, making it known that some local collaborators
were police officers and carapintadas. At the Campo de Mayo
military base outside Buenos Aires, Galeano found evidence that army
personnel had helped prepare the attack, providing explosives and
intelligence, but for some reason this lead did not prosper.
Despite these accusations, and even
though evidence surfaced showing that members of the Buenos Aires
provincial police had also participated in the logistics of the
attack, Galeano did not seem really interested in carrying out a
thorough investigation of the organization that had provided the car
bomb and other such support for the terrorists. [35]
Moreover, the Judge himself acknowledged responsibility for the
destruction of numerous videotapes officially labeled as evidence,
with the excuse that he was blackmailed. In September 2001, after
Galeano admitted his responsibility, the attorneys of Memoria
Activa pressed charges against him and the Federal Chamber
decided to investigate the Judge, who --this notwithstanding-- is
still in charge of the case. [36]
Memoria Activa was not alone
in denouncing Galeano. On 6 April 2003, Congresswoman Nilda Garré,
who under the De la Rúa administration had been chief of the
Ministry of Justice's Special Unit of Investigation of the Attacks,
filed for a political trial against Judge Galeano on fifteen counts
of negligence or misconduct, among them failing to prosecute
irregularities attributed to agencies of the state. [37]
Furthermore, on 19 March 2003, Judge Galeano's former secretary,
Javier de Gamas, after giving testimony to the Federal Oral Court,
was himself indicted and arrested on false testimony charges related
to police participation in the logistics of the attack. [38]
Galeano was also accused by Claudio
Lifschitz, who during the first two years of the investigation was
his adjunct secretary and eventually became a witness himself.
Lifschitz claims in his book that three months before the bombing,
the SIDE had infiltrated an Iranian sleeper cell suspected of links
to Hezbollah, provided logistical support and prompted it to act, in
what was supposed to be a sting operation. In his words, it was a
"controlled operation" that went out of control. When the
investigators discovered these embarrassing and incriminating facts,
the cover-up became official policy. [39]
In 2000, after
Lifschitz publicly denounced Galeano and the SIDE, he was accused by
the DAIA, AMIA and SIDE of violating a "political secret"
(article 222 of the Penal Code). [40]
Lifschitz is currently being prosecuted by Federal Judge Jorge Urso,
although no one has accused him of falsifying information. On the
other hand, the attorneys of Memoria Activa, Alberto Zuppi and
Pablo Jacoby, have pointed out that although at first Lifschitz´s
declarations were hard to believe, all the new evidence tends to
confirm what he wrote in his book. [41]
Thus, it is not surprising that
Argentine intelligence services continuously jeopardized the
investigations. They were plagued by internal conflicts. Many of the
measures suggested by a task force organized with the help of the
CIA, FBI, Mossad, and the French, German and Spanish security
services were announced but never implemented. Yet the worst came
when the SIDE boycotted the CIA, leaking the photograph of Ross
Newland (then CIA delegate in Buenos Aires) to the newspaper Página
12, which published his face under different guises in January
2001. Newland had to flee the country and the CIA broke relations
with the SIDE. [42]
The incident occurred during the government of Fernando de la Rúa,
illustrating that the obstruction of the investigation by state
security agencies was not merely a phenomenon associated to the Menem
administrations, but rather it reflected some
level of deterioration of the state apparatus and/or its chains of
command. The incident shows that both
corruption and the autonomy of certain segments of the state security
apparatus were close to being unmanageable.
Furthermore, in the investigation
of the terrorist attacks, the deterioration of state authority is a
variable that fed back into another, already documented factor of
equal importance: government reluctance to advance in any direction
that might prove incriminating (to the Menem administrations) or
destabilizing (to either the Menem or the De la Rúa
administrations). Raul Kollmann, perhaps the journalist most familiar
with the AMIA case, stated that: "The real problem is that the
Argentine government was never interested in solving the case. At
times, only fifteen to twenty people were assigned to it, while after
the Oklahoma City bombing 5,000 law enforcement officials were
deployed immediately. The United States sent over 1,500 agents to
Africa after the bombing of the embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.
These agents interrogated 10,000 witnesses in four days. In
Argentina, witnesses are still waiting to be called. And it took over
three years to put together a 100-person team of investigators that
never functioned properly."
[43]
When he was sworn in as President
in December 1999, Fernando de la Rúa promised a swift
resolution to the AMIA affair, but the policy of concealment
continued. The chief of the Ministry of Justice's Special Unit of
Investigation of the Attacks, Nilda Garré, who since her
appointment in 2000 had fostered the investigation as never before,
was forced to present her resignation in 2001. She was accused of
hurting the investigation by revealing that Witness "C" had
admitted that Menem´s team had received money to protect Iran
from being investigated, even though it was no news and had been
published in 2000. [44]
At the bottom of the squabble was the annoyance of Jorge De la Rúa,
Minister of Justice and the President's brother, who objected to
Garré's zeal. [45]
She had proved that as part of an official cover-up, police logbooks
had been altered and the electronic address books and planners of
various suspects had been erased. In an interview with New York
Times correspondent Larry Rother, Garré said that "not
only has there been no support for getting to the bottom of this
case; you can also say that some government organs have actively
sabotaged the investigation," adding that "state
intelligence and the federal police are clearly involved… but
there is also evidence pointing to the involvement of agencies
ranging from Immigration to the Foreign Ministry." [46]
Consistent with
these charges is the fact that several of the twenty suspects
brought to trial accused of participating in the AMIA bombing are
former officers of the Police of the Province of Buenos Aires. The
most conspicuous is Juan José Ribelli, a high-ranking officer
accused of nothing less than supplying the terrorists with the
vehicle used as a car bomb. [47]
The latest revelations concerning police
involvement were made in late 2002. A year after the trial
began, the wife of a man specializing in selling stolen cars, who was
charged with supplying the vehicle used as a car bomb in the AMIA
attack, broke down and confessed that her husband had given the
vehicle to agents of the Buenos Aires police as a result of the
latter's extortion. Although her husband had previously denounced the
provincial police, she contradicted herself, first acknowledging and
then denying the link between her husband and the police. Finally,
she panicked, burst into tears and confessed in court that she had
recanted from her original acknowledgement of the link with the
police because she had been threatened by members of the force. [48]
Indeed, the collapse of chains of command in the security agencies of
the state has been proven to be an important element both in the
cover-up and in the mercenary complicities that facilitated the
attack. [49]
It is important to remember here
that the autonomy of state security agencies is to some extent a
legacy of the 1976-83 military dictatorship, which encouraged the
repression of leftist guerillas by autonomous groups of officers of
the armed forces on active duty, in order to free itself from the
constraints of lawful criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, during the
dictatorship the autonomy of paramilitary groups and the state
intelligence agency converged with the perceived self-interests of
the regime, and the central state was an accomplice to the
perpetration of their crimes. By contrast, the 1992 and 1994 bombings
were in no way perceived as desirable by the government, while the
central state as such was an accomplice only to the cover-ups of the
crimes, not their perpetration. The cover-ups were perceived as
damage control.
Corruption as an independent variable
The destruction of the AMIA
building also obliterated the offices of the DAIA (Delegación
de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas), the Jewish umbrella
organization housed together with the AMIA. Unlike the latter, which
is a mutual aid association, the DAIA is the organization that has
traditionally handled the relations between the Jewish Community and
the Argentine State. During a meeting on 21
July 1994, the President of the DAIA, Rubén E. Beraja, also
President of Banco Mayo, stated that the Argentine government was
responsible for investigating the terrorist acts and demanded a
thorough investigation.
However, two years after the
bombing, it became clear that the DAIA and the AMIA´s
leadership had softened their initial demands. At the same time,
Memoria Activa, an organization composed of relatives of the
victims, was created. [50]
While the Jewish leadership avoided confrontations with the
government, Memoria Activa radicalized its position,
systematically denouncing successive findings that showed increasing
irregularities in the investigation coordinated by Judge Juan José
Galeano.
Until 1996 Beraja´s proximity
to the government was accepted by the great majority of the Jewish
community. But towards 1997, a generalized perception of Beraja's
special relation with Menem and Minister of the Interior Carlos
Corach led to increasing public expressions of repulse, on the
grounds of a serious conflict of interests and apparent complicity
with the government´s stonewalling of the investigation. [51]
After the collapse of his bank, documents have shed light on the
special aid given by the Central Bank to Banco Mayo when the sequence
of bank failures began. At present, Beraja is being prosecuted by
Argentina's federal justice. [52]
Two reports published in 2001 by
the Special Investigative Committee on
Illicit Deeds and Money Laundering of the Chamber of Deputies of the
Argentine Congress (CEIHIVLD) [53] detailed the illegal
practices that characterized the financial operations coordinated by
Beraja. Banco Mayo was shown to have received some US$ 350 million in
soft credits from the Central Bank, more than any other bank of its
size. The President of the Central Bank, Pedro Pou, was indicted by
CEIHIVLD, accused of tolerating dubious operations of money
laundering and fiscal evasion on the part of some banks, including
Banco Mayo. Consequently, Pou was forced to resign his position by a
decree signed by President De la Rúa. [54]
As early
as September 1995, Rabbi Avi Weiss had expressed his
disagreement with Beraja's support of the government's investigation
in statements made to the Committee
on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives. [55]
By the third anniversary of the AMIA bombing, in July 1997, crowds
heckled and turned their backs on Beraja, while Laura Ginsberg, a
Memoria Activa militant, spoke scathingly against the
Argentine government. When Beraja and AMIA's President, Oscar
Hansman, apologized to the government for Ginsberg's speech, the
Argentine Jewish community suffered a severe split that was only
overcome in 1999, with the fall of Banco Mayo and Beraja's indictment
and disgrace. Such a denouement generated community consensus over
the government's stonewalling and Beraja's complicity with the
latter. [56]
In July 1999, Memoria Activa
denounced the Argentine government before the Inter-American
Committee on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
(OAS) for its non-investigation of the attacks. When in September
2001 (thirteen days after the attack on the Twin Towers and
the Pentagon) the trial of some twenty individuals accused of
providing logistical support for the terrorists finally began, the
OAS Committee validated Memoria Activa´s charges by
appointing Claudio Grossman, president of the former, as observer to
the trial. [57]
Thus, the President of the DAIA,
who was civil society's chief representative in the AMIA case and the
foremost Argentine civil leader responsible for pressuring a
reluctant administration to pursue justice, was at the same time
president of a bank that, at best, was badly in need of government
favors and, at worst, profited from undue privileges. Many knew what
was going on and kept quiet as long as Beraja's power lasted. In
other words, strong pressures on the government were unlikely because
of corruption and/or conflicts of interest within the more powerful
segments of Argentine civil society (including prominent members of
the Jewish community), whereas pressure stemming from less powerful
segments, such as Memoria Activa, were unlikely to cause more
than some embarrassment to the national administration.
Some conclusions
Neither the Menem nor the De la Rúa
administrations were interested in suffering the destabilizing
effects of an effective investigation that fully uncovered and
exposed the involvement of security forces, rogue military officers
and intelligence agencies in the attacks. Although Menem may have had
more to hide than De la Rúa (especially in relation to his
promises to Syria, prior to the pro-Western shift in his foreign
policy), the negative attitude of the De la Rúa administration
towards Nilda Garré's investigative zeal clearly demonstrates
that it also obstructed justice. The Duhalde Administration, in turn,
insisted on maintaining the secrecy of the SIDE's internal
investigation. And although some positive developments have sprung
from the executive branch in the early stages of Néstor
Kirchner's administration, [58]
the persecution of Claudio Lifschitz by the SIDE and the judiciary
does not bode well.
Although the 1992 and 1994 bombings
remain unsolved, in the sense that no material perpretator of the
attacks has been brought to justice, it is known:
- That
they were an offshoot of the global phenomenon of Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism and its suicidal instrument for mass murder,
and directly linked to Hezbollah and Iran;
- That
they were partly motivated by Menem's broken pre-election promises to
Arab countries, and by the geopolitical gambits of the early months
of his administration, especially vis-à-vis Hafez al-Assad,
who also wielded direct influence on Hezbollah;
- That
local elements were involved in the logistics of the attacks;
- That
an important segment of these local elements was officially linked to
a state apparatus that does not fully respond to legitimate chains of
command, as proven not only by the involvement of rogue police and
military elements, but also by the SIDE boycott of CIA activities
when it leaked to the press the photograph of the latter's chief
operative in Argentina during the De la Rúa administration;
- That
although the autonomy of state security and intelligence agencies is
a legacy of the 1976-83 dictatorship, it became qualitatively
different in the case of the 1992 and 1994 bombings, inasmuch as the
military regime gave carte blanche to paramilitary groups that
conducted crimes it perceived functional to its interests, while the
complicity of rogue security agents with the terrorist attacks of the
1990s was not desirable for the Menem government. The 1976-1983
dictatorship was behind the perpetration of state terrorism, whilst
with regard to the bombings of the 1990s, the successive
administrations were accomplices to the cover-up of the crimes, but
not to the acts of terrorism themselves;
- That
notwithstanding, corrupt practices such as placing the Syrian
national Ibrahim al Ibrahim as special advisor to Argentine Customs,
or granting an Argentine passport to the Syrian arms merchant and
terrorist-suspect Monzer al-Kassar, facilitated all sorts of illegal
wheeling and dealing, some of which was necessary to carry out the
attacks;
- That
neither the Menem nor the De la Rúa administrations were
willing to investigate fully and risk some measure of destabilization
of their governments for the sake of solving the cases, and that they
both incurred in obstruction of justice. This verdict can be extended
to the Duhalde Administration, if we remember the most incriminating
fact against the Argentine state as a whole: that the judge who to
this day (September 2003, three months into the Kirchner
Administration) continues to be in charge of the AMIA investigation
confessed long ago to having personally destroyed evidence relative
to the case. This is also the most compelling indication of the
systemic nature of the phenomena we have analyzed.
Thus, we can see the interplay
between corruption, serious limits to governability and a terrorist
menace that has struck twice in Argentina and can not only strike
again, but could also make use of the laissez faire, laissez
passer made possible by corruption and the erosion of state
authority to provide the logistics for staging attacks elsewhere.
This is
especially evident when we consider that nothing has changed at the
infamous Triple Border, where sleeper cells linked to Islamic
terrorism have been identified by Western intelligence agencies. [59]
As early as March 1994, Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Narcotics Matters, declared his concern over the
fact that the permeability of the Argentine borders could facilitate
possible attacks by fundamentalist groups. [60]
Yet the Argentine government paid little attention to such warnings
until it was too late, and afterwards was unwilling or unable to
significantly alter the situation. The fact that someone like Ibrahim
al Ibrahim was appointed special advisor to the Argentine Customs
makes it necessary to consider the hypothesis that we are confronting
not only impotence arising from an inefficient state apparatus, but
also a complicity with illicit trafficking that knows no bounds.
This is
compounded by the fact that Argentina's Documento Nacional de
Identidad, the key to obtaining a passport, is one of the easiest
to forge in the world. Neither the Menem, the De la Rúa or the
Duhalde governments were inclined to solve this problem. [61]
Likewise, they suspended a project to connect Argentina's 121 border
points via an intranet. [62]
Once again, corruption of such magnitude that it leads to an
increasing erosion of governability has shown itself to cut across
administrations. It is systemic.
Borders
in Argentina seem to be intentionally porous. This is indicated by
the successive cases of Ibrahim al Ibrahim and the frustrations
linked to the identity document, but most dramatically highlighted by
the so called case of the "parallel customs house", whose
investigation was launched in 1996 by Judge
Guillermo Tiscornia. It was established that between 1990 and 1996,
22,000 containers entered the country with false documentation and
forged seals through the harbor and airport of Buenos Aires.
Nevertheless, the case remains unsolved, while several key witnesses
have been murdered over the years, the last in February 2003. [63]
Limits
to governability are such that a government determined to put an end
to this situation is likely to encounter insurmountable difficulties,
whereas one willing to become the accomplice of the murderous forces
that profit from porous borders will find life much easier in the
short and middle terms. Corruption and the erosion of state authority
feed each other, facilitating the activities of terrorists and
traffickers, and jeopardizing the security and well-being not only of
Argentines, but also of people in many other countries. The perverse
dynamics between these variables would appear to be well illustrated
by the case of the 1992 and 1994 terrorist attacks and their aborted
investigations.
NOTES
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